iberal Government, and
five were Unionists. Sir E. Carson only came in in August, making the
number of representatives from the two factions equal and raising the
total to the lucky number of thirteen. What object was supposed to be
fulfilled by making the War Council such a bloated institution it is
hard to say. Almost the only members of the Cabinet who counted and
who were not included on its roll were Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Long.
Be that as it may, the result was virtually to constitute the
Dardanelles Committee the Cabinet for general purposes of the war, and
to lead to its dealing with many matters quite distinct from the
prosecution of the campaign for the Straits. I have a vivid
recollection of one meeting, which probably took place late in June
(Lord Kitchener was not present), and at which the attitude to be
assumed by us with reference to Bulgaria and Greece, particularly
Bulgaria, was discussed. Sir E. Grey wanted a "formula" devised to
indicate to the Sofia Government what that attitude was; as neither he
nor anybody else knew what the attitude was, it was not easy to devise
the formula. Formula is an odious word in any case, recalling, as it
does, algebraical horrors of a forgotten past; but everybody present
wrote out formulae, and dialecticians had the time of their lives. Mr.
Balfour's version was eventually chosen as the most felicitous. But
the worst of it was that this masterpiece of appropriate
phrase-mongering did not bring in the Bulgars on our side. The
triumphant campaign of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front somehow
proved a more potent factor in deciding Tsar Ferdinand as to what
course to pursue, than a whole libraryful of formulae could ever have
effected.

At another meeting, at which Lord Kitchener likewise was not present,
a marked and disagreeable tendency to criticize Sir I. Hamilton for
his ill-success made itself apparent. I was the only representative of
the army present, and it was manifestly impossible for an officer
miles junior to Sir Ian to butt into a discussion of that kind. But
Mr. Churchill spoke up manfully and with excellent effect. The gist of
his observations amounted to this: If you commit a military commander
to the undertaking of an awkward enterprise and then refuse him the
support that he requires, you have no business to abuse him behind his
back if he fails. That seemed to me to fit the situation like a glove;
it did not leave much more to be said on the po