ratification and their thanks; we had a few minutes'
conversation, and were introduced to the other officers present--there
were quite a lot--and we then cleared out, escorted to our gorgeous
Imperial carriages by some of the junior officers. The Naval Attache
spoilt the whole thing by remarking afterwards, "You know, general,
those Johnnies know English just as well as you do." It was most
inconsiderate of him, and he may not have been right; Russian naval
officers down Black Sea way did not seem to know English or even
French.
On this second occasion we only spent twenty-four hours at Mohileff;
the interview with General Alexeieff was successfully brought off on
the first afternoon, MacCaw accompanying me as he understood Russian
thoroughly, although a General Staff Officer interpreted. I told
Alexeieff that our chances of relieving Kut appeared to be slender,
and that he ought to be prepared for its fall although there was still
hope. He thereupon raised the question of our sending a force to near
Alexandretta, so as to aid the contemplated Russian campaign in
Armenia. Such a project was totally opposed to the views of Sir W.
Robertson and our General Staff, and it had at the moment--late in
March--nothing to recommend it at all, apart from the point of view of
the Armenian operations. Although Lord Kitchener and Sir J. Maxwell
had been a little nervous about Egypt during the winter, the General
Staff at the War Office had felt perfectly happy on the subject in
view of the garrison assembled there after the evacuation of the
Gallipoli Peninsula. Now that spring was at hand, any prospect of
serious Turkish attempts across the Sinai Desert was practically at an
end as the dry months were approaching. Troops sent to the Gulf of
Iskanderun at this stage--to get them there must take some
weeks--could not possibly aid Kut, even indirectly. Such side-shows
were totally at variance with our General Staff's views concerning the
proper conduct of the Great War. We wished the Russians well, of
course, in their Armenian operations, and as they held the Black Sea
there appeared to be every prospect of their achieving a considerable
measure of success. But nothing that happened in that part of the
world would be likely to exercise any paramount influence over the
decision of the conflict as a whole.
Alexeieff suggested our transferring troops from Salonika to
Alexandretta. I do not think that he fully realized what that kind o
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