f
thing meant in time, shipping, and so on; but it was pointed out to
him that the French would disapprove of such a move owing to the
importance they attached to the Macedonian affair, while, as for us,
if we took away part of our forces from Salonika we would want to send
them to France to fight the Germans, not to dissipate them on
non-essentials. It was also pointed out that there were very serious
naval objections to starting a brand-new campaign based on the Gulf of
Iskanderun, that the tonnage question was beginning to arouse anxiety,
and that Phillimore (who was at the Stavka at the time) would
certainly endorse this contention. The Russian C.G.S. was not quite
convinced, I am afraid. In the course of the discussion he made a
remark, which was not translated by the interpreter but which MacCaw
told me was to the effect that we could do what he asked perfectly
easily if we liked. That was true enough. We could have deposited an
army at Ayas Bay, no doubt, and could have secured its maritime
communications while it was ashore; but we would have been playing
entirely the wrong game, wasting military resources, and throwing a
strain upon the Allies' sea-power without any adequate justification.
Still, our conference was throughout most amicable. Alexeieff
expressed confidence as regards effecting a powerful diversion on the
Eastern Front during the summer; but he begged me to try to extract
some of our heavy howitzers for him out of our War Office, as he was
terribly handicapped, he said, for want of that type of artillery. It
was the last that I was to see of this eminent soldier and patriot,
who died some time in 1918, broken down under the exertion and anxiety
of trying to save his country from the horrors of Bolshevik
ascendancy.
The Emperor, as I sat next to him at dinner in the evening, referred
to Alexandretta; he had evidently seen Alexeieff in the meantime. He
also begged me to press the question of heavy howitzers for Russia at
home. He asked a good deal about Sir W. Robertson, and he commented on
the fact that two soldiers who had enjoyed no special advantages such
as are not uncommon in the commissioned ranks of most armies,
Robertson and Alexeieff, should have been forced to the front under
the stern pressure of war and should now be simultaneously Chiefs of
the General Staff in England and Russia. He spoke of the possibility
of Lord Kitchener visiting Russia now that his labours at our War
Office we
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