f pre-Bolshevist
governments, Imperial and republican. It was imperative that these
should not fall into the hands of Lenin's warrior rabble that was
spreading eastwards from beyond the Ural Mountains, and it was equally
imperative that the progress of these tumultuary Bolshevist levies
into Siberia should be stayed at the earliest possible moment. These
were duties which, owing to the geographical conditions, naturally
devolved upon the United States and Japan, and, seeing that the United
States were hurrying soldiers in hot haste to the European theatre of
war, the duties in reality properly devolved upon Japan. But it was
now no longer a question of reconciling the views merely of London,
Paris, Rome, and Tokio. A disturbing factor had cropped up. President
Wilson had entered the lists.

The fact that no decision as to Siberia and Vladivostok was arrived at
for weeks, and that when it was arrived at it was an unsatisfactory
one, was not the fault of the British, nor of the French, nor of the
Italian, nor yet of the Japanese Government. We have heard a good deal
at times about "wait and see"; but Mr. Asquith is a very Rupert
compared to the Autocrat reigning in the White House in 1918. Had
Japan been given a free hand, with the full moral support of the
Allies, and with some financial support and support in the shape of
certain forms of war material, Bolshevism might have been stamped out
even before the Central Powers were brought to their knees in 1918. It
would surely be to the interest of the United States, as it would
undoubtedly be to the interest of Canada and Australasia, that the
swelling millions peopling eastern Asia should be encouraged to expand
westwards into the rich but sparsely populated regions lying north of
Mongolia, rather than that they should be seeking to expand across the
Pacific Ocean. As it was, Japan received scanty encouragement, and
only received it after procrastination had been developed to the very
utmost.

What occurred in connection with Siberia and Vladivostok on that
occasion provided an unpleasant foretaste of the pathetic performance
which was to go on for months and months in the following year at
Versailles. It moreover foreshadowed and furthered that untoward
extension of Bolshevism far and wide which has since taken place. Some
of us would willingly have made shift to get on without a League of
Nations could we have been saved from the disastrous consequence of
action on t