presented a higher figure than the
corresponding budgets in either Germany or France. General
Sukhomlinoff, the War Minister on the Neva from 1910 to 1915, was, as
is well known, disgraced in the latter year, and he was tried for his
life after the Revolution.
The Russian victories in Galicia during the winter of 1914-15,
followed as they were by the reduction of the important place of arms,
Przemysl, caused unbounded satisfaction in this country. But those
behind the scenes feared, with only too good reason, that such
triumphs represented no more than a flash in the pan, and that, should
the Germans decide to throw heavy forces into the scale, the Grand
Duke Nicholas would speedily find himself obliged to abandon the
conquests which looked so gratifying on paper. We in the War Office
learnt, indeed, that the Russian generalissimo, who recognized that
the munitions situation did not justify offensive operations on an
ambitious scale, had been indisposed to undertake the capture of
Przemysl, but that political pressure had been brought to bear on him.
Lord Kitchener was constantly watching the Eastern Front with anxiety
during the early months of 1915, fearing that in view of the Russian
weakness some great transfer of enemy forces from East to West might
be instituted. A strategical combination on such lines on the part of
the German Great General Staff would under the existing circumstances
have been a very natural one to adopt. But it is conceivable (if not
very probable) that the higher military authorities in Berlin were
not fully aware of the condition of their antagonists in Poland. The
fact, moreover, remains that in their accounts of the campaign of 1915
the numerous books on the war which have appeared in Germany ignore to
a remarkable extent the munitions difficulties under which the Grand
Duke Nicholas was suffering. That, however, may be attributable to a
disinclination to admit that Hindenburg's successes were due, not to
any outstanding brilliance in the handling of his troops nor to the
gallantry and efficiency of those concerned in the operations under
his orders, but simply to his opponent being almost bereft of
armament. Be that as it may, Russia was in such evil plight for arms
and ammunition from the summer of 1915 on to that of 1916 that she was
wellnigh powerless, except in Armenia. She only became really
formidable again during the period of quiescence that, as usual, set
in during the winter
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