auge the local feeling out there fairly correctly, and became
convinced that we should be able to rely on securing a really
high-class contingent of improvised units for "German East" out of
South Africa, of units composed of tough, self-reliant, experienced
fighting men who might not be disposed to undertake service on the
Western Front. The special character of the theatre of war in East
Africa, the nature of the fighting which its topography imposed on the
contending sides, its climate, its prospects for the settler, and its
geographical position, were all such as to appeal to the dwellers on
the veldt. But when the subject was broached once or twice to Lord K.
during the summer of 1915 he would have nothing to do with it. Once
bitten twice shy. The War Minister looked on side-shows with no kindly
eye. Nor could he be persuaded that this was one which would only be
absorbing resources that could hardly be made applicable to other
quarters.

Mr. Bonar Law, who was then Colonial Minister, was very anxious to
have the military situation in this part of the world cleared up, and
I rather took advantage of Lord K.'s absence in the Near East in
November to bring the whole thing to a head. Sir A. Murray quite
agreed that South Africa ought to be invited to step in and help. So
it came about that the business was practically settled by the time
that the Chief came back from the Dardanelles, and although he was by
no means enthusiastic, he accepted the situation and he chose Sir H.
Smith-Dorrien for the command. Whether this was, or was not, a
justifiable side-show is no doubt a matter of opinion. But a very
large proportion of the troops who eventually conquered "German East"
under Generals Smuts, Hoskins and Van Deventer would scarcely have
been available for effective operations in any other theatre, and the
demands in respect to artillery, aircraft, and so forth were almost
negligible as compared to the resources that were in being even so
early as the winter of 1915-16. Perhaps the most powerful arguments
that could be brought forward against the offensive campaign that was
initiated by General Smuts in German East Africa were its cost and the
amount of ship-tonnage that it absorbed. The primary object for which
operations in this region were undertaken, the capture of Tanga and
Dar-es-Salaam so as to deprive the enemy of their use for naval
purposes, had rather dropped out of consideration owing to the seas
having been