e supply had
just come to hand from America) would mean missing the ship. G.H.Q.
were therefore instructed to forward 20,000 field-gun rounds and 2000
field-howitzer rounds to the Mediterranean port, and were at the same
time assured that the rounds would straightway, over and above the
normal nightly allowance sent across the Channel, be made good from
home. Sent off by G.H.Q. under protest, the field-gun rounds were
replaced _within twenty-four hours_ and the others within four days,
but of the engagement entered into, and kept, by the War Office,
"_1914_" says not one word. Lord French was evidently completely
misinformed on this matter.

It should be added that the amount of heavy artillery included in the
Dardanelles Expeditionary Force was negligible, and that the amount of
medium artillery was relatively very small. Large train-loads of
ammunition for such pieces were never required, nor sent. Inaccurate
statements of this kind tend to discredit much of Lord French's severe
criticism of Lord Kitchener and the department of the Master-General
of the Ordnance, for which there is small justification in any case.

One point made in the "Ammunition" chapter in "_1914_" deserves a word
of comment. Lord French mentions that the supply of shell received at
the front in May proved to be less than half of the War Office
estimate. That kind of thing went on after supply had been transferred
from the War Office to the Ministry of Munitions. I had something to
say to munitions at a subsequent period of the war, as will be touched
upon later, and used to see the returns and estimates. The Munitions
Ministry was invariably behind its estimates (although seldom, if
ever, to the extent of over 50 per cent) right up to the end. There
you have our old friend, the Man of Business, with his intolerable
swank. Some old-established private factories, as well as some new
factories set up during the war, were in the habit of promising more
than they could possibly perform. Certain of them were, indeed, ready
to promise almost anything. Their behaviour, I happen to know, caused
some of our Allies who placed contracts with them and were let in,
extreme annoyance. The names of one or two of them possibly stink in
the nostrils of certain foreign countries to this day, although that
sort of thing may also be common abroad. Those in authority came to
realize in the later stages of the war how little reliance could be
placed on promises, and