n of 1915 onwards up to
just before the Battle of the Somme, was the achievement, not of the
Ministry of Munitions but of the War Office. The Munitions Ministry in
due course did splendid work. Chancellor of the Exchequer become
lord-paramount of a great spending Department of State, its chief was
on velvet. "Copper" turned footpad, he knew the ropes, he could flout
the Treasury--and he did. But it is a pity that unwarrantable claims
should have been put forward on behalf of the department in not
irresponsible quarters at a time when they could not be denied, claims
which have tended to bring the department as a whole into undeserved
disrepute amongst those who know the facts.

CHAPTER XI

COUNCILS, COMMITTEES, AND CABINETS

The responsibilities of experts at War Councils -- The Rt. Hon.
A. Fisher's views -- Discussion as to whether these meet the case
-- Under the War Cabinet system, the question does not arise --
The Committee of Imperial Defence merged in the War Council early
in the conflict -- The Dardanelles Committee -- Finding a formula
-- Mr. Churchill backs up Sir I. Hamilton -- The spirit of
compromise -- The Cabinet carrying on _pari passu_ with the
Dardanelles Committee -- Personal experiences with the Cabinet --
The War Council which succeeded the Dardanelles Committee -- An
illustration of the value of the War Cabinet system -- Some of
its inconveniences -- Ministers -- Mr. Henderson -- Sir E. Carson
-- Mr. Bonar Law -- The question of resignation of individuals --
Lord Curzon -- Mr. Churchill -- Mr. Lloyd George.

Before proceeding to refer to a few personal experiences in connection
with the Ministerial pow-wows at which the conduct of the war was
decided, there is one matter of some public importance to which a
reference will not be out of place. That matter is the question of
responsibility imposed upon experts at gatherings of this kind. Are
they to wait until they are spoken to, no matter what folly is on the
tapis, or are they to intervene without invitation when things become
serious? My own experience is that on these occasions Ministers have
such a lot to say that the expert is likely to be overlooked in the
babel unless he flings himself into the fray.

The point is suggested by the "Conclusions" in the "First Report" of
the Dardanelles Commission. The Commissioners gave it as their opinion
that at the time of the in