oval in
the winter of 1914-15. Then the enemy resources in these environs had
been insignificant, the Turkish communications leading thither had
still been interrupted by the Taurus Mountains, and there had been no
U-boats in the Mediterranean. Now the enemy was fully prepared in this
quarter and would be on the look-out for our troops, the tunnels
through the Taurus had been completed, and warships and transports
could not possibly have lain moored in the roadstead of Alexandretta
for fear of submarines. The landing would have had to take place in
the inner portion of the Gulf of Iskanderun, Ayas Bay, where there
were no facilities, where the surroundings were unhealthy, and where
it would be particularly easy for the Turks to put up a stolid
resistance. Our view was that for any operation of this kind to be
initiated with reasonable safety, a very large body of troops would be
necessary, that as far as Egypt was concerned the Nile Delta could be
rendered absolutely secure with a much smaller expenditure of force,
and that the inevitable result of embarking on a campaign in this new
region would be to withdraw yet more of the Entente fighting resources
from the main theatre of war in France. It would have been a side-show
for which very little could be said and the objections to which seemed
to us manifest and overwhelming. The War Council took our advice and
dropped the scheme, although Lord Kitchener, who was out in the
Aegean, favoured it. Any anxiety that prevailed as to Egypt settled
itself shortly afterwards owing to the Gallipoli troops, so skilfully
withdrawn from Anzac, Suvla and Helles, all assembling in the Nile
Delta, where they were refitted and obtained some rest after their
terribly arduous campaign in the Thracian Chersonese. This practically
synchronized with the time of my leaving the War Office for the time
being and proceeding to Russia.
As will be mentioned in Chapter XIV., one heard more about
Alexandretta while out in that country. I, moreover, became indirectly
concerned in that same old question again at a considerably later
date. For, early in October 1917, the War Cabinet hit upon a great
notion. On the close of the Flanders operations a portion of Sir D.
Haig's forces were to be switched thither to succour Generals Allenby
and Marshall in their respective campaigns, and were to be switched
back again so as to be on hand for the opening of active work on the
Western Front at the beginning o
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