cupation of Palestine and
Syria constituted a side-show on a very important scale indeed, and
they at one period swallowed up contingents of British troops that
were somewhat badly needed on the Western Front, just as the Salonika
business did. Troops of that character, troops fit to throw against
the Hindenburg Line, however, represented quite an insignificant
proportion of the forces with which General Allenby achieved his
startling triumphs in the year 1918. The urgent need of increasing our
strength in France and Flanders during the winter of 1917-18 was fully
realized by the General Staff at the War Office, and efforts were made
to induce the War Cabinet to consent to withdraw some of the British
troops from Palestine. But nothing was done in the matter until after
the successful German offensive of March, when the enemy almost drove
a wedge through the Allies' front near Amiens. After that the bulk of
General Allenby's British infantry were taken from him and rushed off
to France, native troops from India which had been created by Sir C.
Monro since he had taken up the chief command there in 1916, together
with some veteran Indian companies from Mesopotamia, being sent in
their place. The brilliant offensive which carried our flag to
Damascus and on to Aleppo after utterly defeating the Turks was
executed with a soldiery of whom the greater part could be spared from
the decisive theatre. The conquering army was composed almost entirely
of mounted men for whom there was little scope in France, or of Indian
troops. Even had the results been infinitely less satisfactory to the
Entente in themselves than they actually were, a side-show run on such
lines was a perfectly legitimate undertaking.

The same principle to some extent holds good in respect to the
conquest of Mesopotamia by Sir S. Maude and Sir W. Marshall. The
troops which won such striking successes in that theatre of war
included a considerable proportion of units which would not have been
employed on the Western Front in any case. The army was to a large
extent a native Indian one, and latterly it included its quota of the
freshly organized units which General Monro had created. The fact
remains, however, that from April 1916 (when Kut fell) until the end
of the war, a considerable force of British white troops was
continuously locked up in this remote region, engaged upon what can
hardly be called a necessary side-show.

In connection with the remarkabl