in the main to India to carry out, and that the
commander and staff for the contemplated offensive, as well as the
reinforcements needed for the purpose, should come across the Indian
Ocean from Bombay.

At a very early stage it became apparent that our information
concerning the enemy districts nearest to the frontier between German
territory and British East Africa was defective, while information as
to the districts on our own side was not all that might be wished, and
I gathered from Hoskins at the time (and also later on from Colonel G.
Thesiger, Hoskins' predecessor, who brought home his battalion of the
Rifle Brigade from India during the winter of 1914-15 and who was
killed when commanding a division at Loos in the autumn of 1915) that
the prosecution of active intelligence work had received little
encouragement from home during their terms of office. That is the
worst of a corps like the King's African Rifles being under the
Colonial Office instead of under the War Office, although there are
adequate reasons for that arrangement; but I cannot help thinking that
if the General Staff had pressed the matter, not much difficulty would
have been encountered in altering the Colonial Office's point of view,
and that both no doubt were to blame. It may also be remarked
incidentally that the Colonial Office probably has no secret service
funds at its disposal. Still, be that as it may, there was something
amiss.

Here we were, with British soil actually in contact with an extensive
province in the hands of a potential enemy and known to be garrisoned
by a considerable body of native troops. Everything pointed to the
need for extensive reconnaissance work in the borderland districts
with a view to possible eventualities. Numbers of active, intelligent,
and adventurous young British officers, admirably fitted for
acquiring military information, were stationed on our side of the
frontier. And yet when the storm broke we were unprepared to meet it.
We had plans worked out in the utmost detail for depositing the
Expeditionary Force at its concentration points in French territory.
Our naval policy was to all intents and purposes framed with a German
war as its ultimate goal. The probability of a conflict with the
Boches had for some years past virtually governed our military policy.
But in East Africa we were in a measure caught napping.

There had been lack of foresight. I had been guilty of this myself, so
that I have