sence of Von
Spee's squadron of swift cruisers in the Pacific. They likewise were
anxious that the German wireless stations of great range and power in
Togoland, the Cameroons, "German South-West," and "German East" should
be brought to nought.

Then there was also Kiao Chao. The capture of that enemy naval
stronghold in the Far East was regarded as eminently desirable, and
although the Japanese were ready and willing to take the thing on
alone it seemed expedient that we should contribute a small contingent
to assist, very much on the same principle as the French and Italians
liked to have small contingents fighting under the orders of General
Allenby during his triumphant operations in Palestine and Syria. Our
military garrisons at Tientsin and Hong-Kong could easily find a
couple of battalions, and from our British point of view this
contribution may be set down as coming within the category of an
excusable, if not an unavoidable, side-show. Apart from East Africa,
none of these minor sets of operations absorbed more than
insignificant military forces, which in most cases were composed
largely of Colonial coloured troops who were hardly fitted for
fighting on the Western Front at that stage. In almost all of them,
except "German East" and Kiao Chao, the object had been achieved
within a few weeks of the outbreak of hostilities, and even the
bitterest foes of the side-show in the abstract will admit that the
end justified the means.

The question of an expedition to the Shatt-el-Arab was first raised by
the India Office. Such an undertaking could indeed hardly suggest
itself during the first few weeks of the war, seeing that the Ottoman
Empire did not become involved until some weeks had elapsed. The
object of this Mesopotamia side-show, which ultimately developed into
one of the greatest campaigns ever undertaken by a European Power in a
region beyond the seas, was, to start with, simply the seizure of the
water-way for the length that this is navigable by ocean-going ships
together with the port of Basrah, and to secure the safety of the
oil-fields of the Karun. The operation incidentally could hardly fail
to exercise considerable political effect around the Persian Gulf,
which was all to the good, and the project did not call for the
employment of a large force to effect the purpose that was in view at
the start. Most military authorities would surely class this as a
thoroughly justifiable, if perhaps not an abs