t on which we and those things external
to us are dependent. As a subject of cognition, LAW is the relation of
things and their effects to one another; as a subject of the will, it is
a motive of action, and is then equivalent to COMMAND or PROHIBITION.

PRINCIPLE is likewise such a law for action, except that it has not
the formal definite meaning, but is only the spirit and sense of law
in order to leave the judgment more freedom of application when the
diversity of the real world cannot be laid hold of under the definite
form of a law. As the judgment must of itself suggest the cases in which
the principle is not applicable, the latter therefore becomes in that
way a real aid or guiding star for the person acting.

Principle is OBJECTIVE when it is the result of objective truth, and
consequently of equal value for all men; it is SUBJECTIVE, and then
generally called MAXIM if there are subjective relations in it, and if
it therefore has a certain value only for the person himself who makes
it.

RULE is frequently taken in the sense of LAW, and then means the same
as Principle, for we say "no rule without exceptions," but we do not
say "no law without exceptions," a sign that with RULE we retain to
ourselves more freedom of application.

In another meaning RULE is the means used of discerning a recondite
truth in a particular sign lying close at hand, in order to attach to
this particular sign the law of action directed upon the whole truth. Of
this kind are all the rules of games of play, all abridged processes in
mathematics, &c.

DIRECTIONS and INSTRUCTIONS are determinations of action which have
an influence upon a number of minor circumstances too numerous and
unimportant for general laws.

Lastly, METHOD, MODE OF ACTING, is an always recurring proceeding
selected out of several possible ones; and METHODICISM (METHODISMUS) is
that which is determined by methods instead of by general principles or
particular prescriptions. By this the cases which are placed under such
methods must necessarily be supposed alike in their essential parts.
As they cannot all be this, then the point is that at least as many as
possible should be; in other words, that Method should be calculated
on the most probable cases. Methodicism is therefore not founded on
determined particular premises, but on the average probability of cases
one with another; and its ultimate tendency is to set up an average
truth, the constant and uniform