ized by the ecclesiastical law as administered in England. It did
not either extend the causes of a suit for nullity by adding such
grounds as antenuptial incontinence, even if accompanied with
pregnancy, nor did it borrow from the civil law of Rome either lunacy or
crime as grounds for divorce.

Much comment has been made on the different grounds on which divorce is
allowed to a husband and to a wife,--it being necessary to prove
infidelity in both cases, but a wife being compelled to show either an
aggravation of that offence or an addition to it. Opinions probably will
always differ whether the two sexes should be placed on an equality in
this respect, abstract justice being invoked, and the idea of marriage
as a mere contract pointing in one direction, and social considerations
in the other. But the reason of the legislature for making the
distinction is clear. It is that the wife is entitled to an absolute
divorce only if her reconciliation with her husband is neither to be
expected nor desired. This was no doubt the view taken by the House of
Lords. In 1801 a Mrs Addison claimed an absolute divorce on the ground
of her husband's incest with her sister. The matter was long debated,
but Lord Thurlow, who appeared in the House of Lords for the last time
in order to support the bill, turned the scale by arguing that it was
improper that the wife should under such circumstances return to her
husband (see Campbell, _Lives of the Chancellors_, vii. 145). "Why do
you," he said, "grant to the husband a divorce for the adultery of the
wife? Because he ought not to forgive her, and separation is inevitable.
Where the wife cannot forgive, and separation is inevitable by reason of
the crime of the husband, the wife is entitled to the like remedy."

The act (sec. 32) provided, in case of dissolution, for maintenance of
the wife by the husband on principles similar to those recognized by the
ecclesiastical courts, and (sec. 45) for the settlement of the property
of a guilty wife on her husband or children; but this enactment was
imperfect, as provision was made only for a settlement and not for
payment of an allowance, and none was made for altering settlements made
in view or in consequence of a marriage. The act (sec. 35) provides also
in all divorce proceedings, and also in those of nullity, for provision
for the custody, maintenance and education of children by the court:
provisions of great value, which were unfortunately f