so severe a nature that intellectual community between the parties
has ceased and is not likely to be re-established. A divorced wife, if
not exclusively the guilty party, may retain her husband's name; but if
exclusively guilty, her former husband may compel her to resume her
maiden name.

By the law of _Denmark_, according to the Code of King Christian the
Fifth, complete divorce could be obtained for incest; for leprosy,
whether contracted before or after marriage; for transportation for
crime or flight from justice, after three years, though not for crime
itself; and for exile not arising from crime, after seven years.

In _Sweden_ complete divorce is granted by judicial sentence for
adultery, and in _Russia_ for that cause and also for incompatibility of
temper (Ayliffe, Par. 49). On the other hand, in _Spain_ marriage is
indissoluble, and the ecclesiastical courts have retained their
exclusive cognizance of matrimonial causes. In _Italy_ certain articles
of the Civil Code deal with separation, voluntary and judicial, but
divorce is not allowed in any form.

In _France_ the law of divorce has had a chequered history. Before the
Revolution the Roman canon law prevailed, marriage was considered
indissoluble, and only divorce _a mensa et thoro_, known as _la
separation d'habitation_, was permitted; though it would appear that in
the earliest age of the monarchy divorce _a vinculo matrimonii_ was
allowed. _La separation d'habitation_ was granted at the instance of a
wife for cruelty by her husband or false accusation of a capital crime,
or for habitual treatment with contempt before the inmates of the house;
but a wife could not obtain a separation for adultery by her husband,
although he had his remedy in case of adultery by his wife. In every
case the sentence of a judicial tribunal, which took precautions against
collusion, was necessary. But the Revolution may be said to have swept
away marriage among the institutions which it overwhelmed, and by the
law of the 20th of September 1792 so great facility was given for
divorce _a vinculo matrimonii_ as practically to terminate the
obligations of marriage. A reaction came with the Code Napoleon, yet
even under that system of law divorce remained comparatively easy.
Mutual consent, expressed in the manner and continued for a period
specified by the law, was cause for a divorce (the principle of the
Roman law being adopted on this point), but such consent could not take