butors. The principles of the act of 1857 have
beyond question been justified by the relief required by and afforded
to the general community.

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

We may now turn to the law of divorce as administered in the other
countries of the modern world. On the main question whether marriage is
to be considered indissoluble they will be found to range themselves on
one side or the other according to the influence upon them of the Church
of Rome and its canon law.

In _Scotland_ it has long been the law that marriage can be dissolved at
the instance of either party by judicial sentence on the grounds of
adultery or of desertion, termed non-adherence, and the spouses could in
such case remarry, except with the paramour,--at all events if the
paramour was named in the decree (and the name is sometimes omitted for
that reason). A divorce _a mensa et thoro_ could also be granted for
cruelty. By the Court of Session Act 1830, the jurisdiction in divorce
was transferred from a body of commissaries to the court of session.

By the law of _Holland_ complete divorce could be granted by judicial
sentence on the grounds of adultery or of wilful and malicious
desertion, to which were added unnatural offences and imprisonment for
life, and such divorce gave the power of remarriage, except with the
person with whom adultery was proved to have been committed, but there
would seem to be a doubt whether this power extended to the guilty party
(Voet, _De divortiis_, lit. 24, tit. 2). Divorce _a mensa et thoro_
could be granted on the grounds allowed by the canon law.

The Code of _Prussia_ of 1794 contained elaborate provisions which gave
great facility of divorce. A complete divorce could be obtained by
judicial sentence for the following causes:--(1) Adultery or unnatural
offences; and adultery by a husband formed no bar to his obtaining a
divorce against his wife for adultery; and even an illicit intimacy,
from which a presumption of adultery might arise, was held sufficient
for a divorce. (2) Wilful desertion. (3) Obstinate refusal of the rights
of marriage, which was considered as equivalent to desertion. (4)
Incapacity to perform the duties of marriage, even if arising subsequent
to the marriage; and the same effect was assigned to other incurable
bodily defects that excited disgust and horror. (5) Lunacy, if after a
year there was no reasonable hope of recovery. (6) An attempt on the
life of one spouse by th