egatives and
the negative implication of positives. I therefore deal with this
subject in a separate chapter following on the ordinary doctrines of
Immediate Inference, where I try to explain the simple Law of Thought
involved. When I say that the extension is legitimate, I mean that it
may be made without departing from the traditional view of Logic as
a practical science, conversant with the nature of thought and its
expression only in so far as it can provide practical guidance against
erroneous interpretations and inferences. The extension that I propose
is in effect an attempt to bring within the fold of Practical Logic
some of the results of the dialectic of Hegel and his followers,
such as Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet, Professor Caird and Professor
Wallace.[10]

The logical processes formulated by Aristotle are merely stages in the
movement of thought towards attaining definite conceptions of reality.
To treat their conclusions as positions in which thought may dwell and
rest, is an error, against which Logic itself as a practical science
may fairly be called upon to guard. It may even be conceded that the
Aristotelian processes are artificial stages, courses that thought
does not take naturally, but into which it has to be forced for a
purpose. To concede this is not to concede that the Aristotelian logic
is useless, as long as we have reason on our side in holding that
thought is benefited and strengthened against certain errors by
passing through those artificial stages.

[Footnote 1: The first statement of the Law of Identity in the
form _Ens est ens_ is ascribed by Hamilton (_Lectures_, iii.
91) to Antonius Andreas, a fourteenth century commentator
on the _Metaphysics_. But Andreas is merely expounding what
Aristotle sets forth in iii. 4, 1006 _a, b_. _Ens est ens_
does not mean in Andreas what A is A means in Hamilton.]

[Footnote 2: Greek: to gar auto hama huparchein te kai me
huparchein adynaton to auto kai kata to auto, . . . ahute de
pason esti bebaiotate ton archon. iii. 3, 1005_b_, 19-23.]

[Footnote 3: Hamilton credits Andreas with maintaining,
"against Aristotle," that "the principle of Identity, and not
the principle of Contradiction, is the one absolutely first".
Which comes first, is a scholastic question on which ingenuity
may be exercised. But in fact Aristotle put the principle
of Identity first in the above plain sense, and And