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positions as, "It is possible to be" ([Greek: dynaton einai]), "It admits of being" ([Greek: endechetai einai]), "It must be" ([Greek: anankaion einai]), "It is impossible to be" ([Greek: adynaton einai])? What is implied in saying "No" to such propositions put interrogatively? "Is it possible for Socrates to fly?" "No." Does this mean that it is not possible for Socrates to fly, or that it is possible for Socrates not to fly? A disputant who had trapped a respondent into admitting that it is possible for Socrates not to fly, might have pushed the concession farther in some such way as this: "Is it possible for Socrates not to walk?" "Certainly." "Is it possible for him to walk?" "Yes." "When you say that it is possible for a man to do anything do you not believe that it is possible for him to do it?" "Yes." "But you have admitted that it is possible for Socrates not to fly?" It was in view of such perplexities as these that Aristotle set forth the true contradictories of his four Modals. We may laugh at such quibbles now and wonder that a grave logician should have thought them worth guarding against. But historically this is the origin of the Modals of Formal Logic, and to divert the names of them to signify other distinctions than those between modes of qualifying the certainty of a statement is to introduce confusion. Thus we find "Alexander was a great general," given as an example of a Contingent Modal, on the ground that though as a matter of fact Alexander was so he might have been otherwise. It was not _necessary_ that Alexander should be a great general: therefore the proposition is _contingent_. Now the distinction between Necessary truth and Contingent truth may be important philosophically: but it is merely confusing to call the character of propositions as one or the other by the name of Modality. The original Modality is a mode of expression: to apply the name to this character is to shift its meaning. A more simple and obviously unwarrantable departure from tradition is to extend the name Modality to any grammatical qualification of a single verb in common speech. On this understanding "Alexander conquered Darius" is given by Hamilton as a _Pure_ proposition, and "Alexander conquered Darius honourably" as a _Modal_. This is a merely grammatical distinction, a distinction in the mode of composing the predicate term in common speech. In logical tradition Modality is a mode of qualifying the certain
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