than solitary
reflection or reading.

The first to practise this process on a memorable scale, and with
a distinct method and purpose, was Socrates. To insist upon the
necessity of clear conceptions, and to assist by his dialectic
procedure in forming them, was his contribution to philosophy.

His plan was to take a common name, profess ignorance of its meaning,
and ask his interlocutor whether he would apply it in such and such
an instance, producing one after another. According to Xenophon's
_Memorabilia_ he habitually chose the commonest names, _good_,
_unjust_, _fitting_, and so forth, and tried to set men thinking
about them, and helped them by his questions to form an intelligent
conception of the meaning.

For example, what is the meaning of injustice? Would you say that
the man who cheats or deceives is unjust? Suppose a man deceives his
enemies, is there any injustice in that? Can the definition be that
a man who deceives his friends is unjust? But there are cases where
friends are deceived for their own good: are these cases of injustice?
A general may inspirit his soldiers by a falsehood. A man may cajole
a weapon out of his friend's hand when he sees him about to commit
suicide. A father may deceive his son into taking medicine. Would you
call these men unjust? By some such process of interrogation we
are brought to the definition that a man is unjust who deceives his
friends to their hurt.

Observe that in much of his dialectic the aim of Socrates was merely
to bring out the meaning lying vague and latent, as it were, in
the common mind. His object was simply what we have called the
verification of the meaning. And a dialectic that confines itself to
the consideration of what is ordinarily meant as distinct from what
ought to be meant may often serve a useful purpose. Disputes about
words are not always as idle as is sometimes supposed. Mr. H. Sidgwick
truly remarks (_a propos_ of the terms of Political Economy) that
there is often more profit in seeking a definition than in finding it.
Conceptions are not merely cleared but deepened by the process. Mr.
Sidgwick's remarks are so happy that I must take leave to quote them:
they apply not merely to the verification of ordinary meaning but also
to the study of special uses by authorities, and the reasons for those
special uses.

"The truth is--as most readers of Plato know, only it is a
truth difficult to retain and apply--that what we gain by