e, which is called
healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all
names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures
primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only
similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field
means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the
beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of
"lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His
works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the
signification of names can be defined only from what is said of
creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical
sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the
cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is
good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's
goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its
meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily
to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these
names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially.
For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is
the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a
more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these
names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because
these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the
imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to
creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for
instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]

Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of
God Temporally?

Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures
are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De
Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the
divine substance; and "C