avage du temps_.

But if it be in this manner, that time wastes the solid masses of this
globe; and if all the solid masses of the earth have acquired their
solid state by the same means, _i.e._ by heat and fusion, as is
maintained in the present theory, we should find similar pyramidal
mountains formed of different materials. Now there can be nothing more
different than masses of lime-stone and those of granite. But pyramidal
mountains are equally formed of those two different materials. In plate
V, under the letter B, may be seen the calcareous pyramids which are
near the _col de la Seigne_, and which in plate VI. are represented
under the letter G.

Here is a view of the summit of the Alps, from whence we may be allowed
to draw the most important conclusions in favour of our theory.

This summit is of solid granite, a mass in which there is no
stratification, such as is to be perceived in all the other masses of
those alpine regions. With regard again to the extent of this mass of
granite, its basis is about two leagues in breadth, by at least thrice
that space in length; and now we are to consider in what shape this mass
of granite presents itself to our view.

The summit of Mont Blanc, which may be considered as in the centre of
this mass, is a pyramid; and this great central pyramid is surrounded by
a number of other great pyramids of the same kind. The points of those
pyramids are extremely lofty; and, having sides often vastly steep, if
not perpendicular, those colossal pyramids rise from the icy valleys in
such a shape as has given occasion to their being named _needles_. Thus
we find the whole space of this granite mass consisting of a mixture of
icy valleys, and pyramidal rocks on which hardly any thing rests.

Now, these lofty rocks or pointed mountains must have been either
originally formed of that shape, or posteriorly hewn out by the hand
of nature, gradually wasting mountains in the course of time, and
operations of the surface. If it is by the first that we are to explain
the present state of things, then observation is superfluous, and our
reasoning is at an end; for, when even observation should not contradict
the proposition, which it actually does, it would be useless, as it can
afford no data from a former state, which is supposed to have been no
other than it is at present; and reasoning cannot be admitted if we have
no data. Therefore, if we are to reason upon the subject, we are obliged
to