writ of summons and sitting
in parliament, was a peer, but doubt whether "even at this day the
doctrine of that case ought to be considered as generally applicable, or
may be limited by time and circumstances."[468] (p. 33.)
It seems, with much deference to more learned investigators, rather
improbable that, either before or after the regular admission of the
knights and burgesses by representation, and consequently the
constitution of a distinct lords' house of parliament, a writ of summons
could have been lawfully withheld at the king's pleasure from any one
holding such lands by barony as rendered him notoriously one of the
_majores barones_. Nor will this be much affected by arguments from the
inexpediency or supposed anomaly of permitting the right of sitting as a
peer of parliament to be transferred by alienation. The Lords' committee
dwell at length upon them. And it is true that, in our original feudal
constitution, the fiefs of the crown could not be alienated without its
consent. But when this was obtained, when a barony had passed by
purchase, it would naturally draw with it, as an incident of tenure, the
privilege of being summoned to parliament, or, in language more
accustomed in those times, the obligation of doing suit and service to
the king in his high court. Nor was the alienee, doubtless, to be taxed
without his own consent, any more than another tenant _in capite_. What
incongruity, therefore, is there in the supposition that, after tenants
in fee simple acquired by statute the power of alienation without
previous consent of the crown, the new purchaser stood on the same
footing in all other respects as before the statute? It is also much to
be observed that the claim to a summons might be gained by some methods
of purchase, using that word, of course, in the legal sense. Thus the
husbands of heiresses of baronies were frequently summoned, and sat as
tenants by courtesy after the wife's death; though it must be owned that
the committee doubt, in their Third Report (p. 47), whether tenancy by
courtesy of a dignity was ever allowed as a right. Thus, too, every
estate created in tail male was a diversion of the inheritance by the
owner's sole will from its course according to law. Yet in the case of
the barony of Abergavenny, even so late as the reign of James I., the
heir male, being in seisin of the lands, was called by writ as baron, to
the exclusion of the heir general. Surely this was an authentic
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