not sitting, by the king's ordinary council. Upon the
dissolution of the _Aula Regia_ many petitions, which parliament or the
council could not conveniently dispose of, were referred to the
chancellor, sometimes with and sometimes without assessors. To avoid the
circuity of applying to parliament or the council, the petition was very
soon, in many instances, addressed originally to the chancellor
himself." (Lives of Chancellors, i. 7.)

In the latter part of Edward III.'s long reign this equitable
jurisdiction had become, it is likely, of such frequent exercise, that
we may consider the following brief summary by Lord Campbell as probable
by analogy and substantially true, if not sustained in all respects by
the evidence that has yet been brought to light:--"The jurisdiction of
the Court of Chancery was now established in all matters where its own
officers were concerned, in petitions of right where an injury was
alleged to be done to a subject by the king or his officers in relieving
against judgments in courts of law (lord C. gives two instances), and
generally in cases of fraud, accident, and trust." (p. 291.)

In the reign of Richard II. the writ of _subpoena_ was invented by
John de Waltham, master of the rolls; and to this a great importance
seems to have been attached at the time, as we may perceive by the
frequent complaints of the commons in parliament, and by the
traditionary abhorrence in which the name of the inventor was held. "In
reality," says lord Campbell, "he first framed it in its present form
when a clerk in Chancery in the latter end of the reign of Edward III.;
but the invention consisted in merely adding to the old clause,
_Quibusdam certis de causis, the words 'Et hoc sub poena centum
librarum nullatenus omittas_;' and I am at a loss to conceive how such
importance was attached to it, or how it was supposed to have brought
about so complete a revolution in equitable proceedings, for the penalty
was never enforced; and if the party failed to appear, his default was
treated, according to the practice prevailing in our own time, as a
contempt of court, and made the foundation of compulsory process." (p.
296.)

The commons in parliament, whose sensitiveness to public grievances was
by no means accompanied by an equal sagacity in devising remedies, had,
probably without intention, vastly enhanced the power of the chancellor
by a clause in a remedial act passed in the thirty-sixth year of Edward
III