arge), "or by writ original at the common law" (in a civil suit), "nor
shall be put out of his franchise of freehold, unless he have been duly
put to answer, and forejudged of the same by due course of law."

Lord Hale has quoted a remarkable passage from a Year-book, not long
after these statutes of 25 Edw. III. and 28 Edw. III., which, if Sir F.
Palgrave had not overlooked, he would have found not very favourable to
his high notions of the king's prerogative in council. "In after ages,"
says Hale, "the constant opinion and practice was to disallow any
reversals of judgment by the council, which appears by the notable case
in Year-book, 39 Edw. III. 14." (Jurisdiction of Lords' House, p. 41.)
It is indeed a notable case, wherein the chancellor before the council
reverses a judgment of a court of law. "Mes les justices ne pristoient
nul regard al reverser devant le council, par ceo que ce ne fust place
ou jugement purroit estre reverse." If the council could not exercise
this jurisdiction on appeal, which is not perhaps expressly taken away
by any statute, much less against the language of so many statutes could
they lawfully entertain any original suit. Such, however, were the
vacillations of a motley assembly, so steady the perseverance of
government in retaining its power, so indefinite the limits of ancient
usage, so loose the phrases of remedial statutes, passing sometimes by
their generality the intentions of those who enacted them, so useful,
we may add, and almost indispensable, was a portion of those
prerogatives which the crown exercised through the council and chancery,
that we find soon afterwards a statute (37 Edw. III. c. 18), which
recognises in some measure those irregular proceedings before the
council, by providing only that those who make suggestions to the
chancellor and great council, by which men are put in danger against the
form of the charter, shall give security for proving them. This is
rendered more remedial by another act next year (38 Edw. III. c. 9),
which, however, leaves the liberty of making such suggestions untouched.
The truth is, that the act of 25 Edw. III. went to annihilate the legal
and equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery--the former of which
had been long exercised, and the latter was beginning to spring up. But
the 42 Edw. III. c. 3, which seems to go as far as the former in the
enacting words, will be found, according to the preamble, to regard only
criminal charges