g's answer appears rather equivocal.
The principle seems nevertheless to have been generally established,
about the reign of Henry VI., that the Court of Chancery exercises
merely a remedial jurisdiction, not indeed controllable by courts of
law, unless possibly in such circumstances as cannot be expected, but
bound by its general responsibility to preserve the limits which ancient
usage and innumerable precedents have imposed. It was at the end of this
reign, and not in that of Richard II., according to the writer so often
quoted, that the great enhancement of the chancellor's authority, by
bringing feoffments to uses within it, opened a new era in the history
of our law. And this the judges brought on themselves by their narrow
adherence to technical notions. They now began to discover this; and
those of Edward IV., as lord Campbell well says, were "very bold men,"
having repealed the statute _de donis_ by their own authority in
Taltarum's case--a stretch of judicial power beyond any that the Court
of Chancery had ventured upon. They were also exceedingly jealous of
that court; and in one case, reported in the Year-books (22 Edw. IV.
37), advised a party to disobey an injunction from the Court of
Chancery, telling him that, if the chancellor committed him to the
Fleet, they would discharge the prisoner by _habeas corpus_. (Lord
Campbell, p. 394.) The case seems to have been one where, in modern
times, no injunction would have been granted, the courts of law being
competent to apply a remedy.
NOTE XI. Page 145.
This intricate subject has been illustrated, since the first publication
of these volumes, in an Essay upon the original Authority of the King's
Council, by Sir Francis Palgrave (1834), written with remarkable
perspicuity and freedom from diffusiveness. But I do not yet assent to
the judgment of the author as to the legality of proceedings before the
council, which I have represented as unconstitutional, and which
certainly it was the object of parliament to restrain.
"It seems," he says, "that in the reign of Henry III. the council was
considered as a court of peers within the terms of Magna Charta; and
before which, as a court of original jurisdiction, the rights of tenants
holding _in capite_ or by barony were to be discussed and decided, and
it unquestionably exercised a direct jurisdiction over all the king's
subjects" (p. 34). The first volume of Close Rolls, published by Mr.
Hardy since Sir F. P
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