., that, "If any man that feeleth himself aggrieved contrary to any
of the articles above written, or others contained in divers statutes,
will come into the Chancery, or any for him, and thereof make his
complaint, he shall presently there have remedy by force of the said
articles or statutes, without elsewhere pursuing to have remedy." Yet
nothing could be more obvious than that the breach of any statute was
cognizable before the courts of law. And the mischief of permitting men
to be sued vexatiously before the chancellor becoming felt, a statute
was enacted, thirty years indeed after this time (17 Ric. II. c. 6),
analogous altogether to those in the late reign respecting the
jurisdiction of the council, which, reciting that "people be compelled
to come before the king's council, or in the Chancery, by writs grounded
on untrue suggestions," provides that "the chancellor for the time
being, presently after that such suggestions be duly found and proved
untrue, shall have power to ordain and award damages, according to his
discretion, to him which is so troubled unduly as aforesaid." "This
remedy," lord Campbell justly remarks, "which was referred to the
discretion of the chancellor himself, whose jurisdiction was to be
controlled, proved, as might be expected, wholly ineffectual; but it was
used as a parliamentary recognition of his jurisdiction, and a pretence
for refusing to establish any other check on it." (p. 247.)

A few years before this statute the commons had petitioned (13 Ric. II.,
Rot. Parl. iii. 269) that the chancellor might make no order against the
common law, and that no one should appear before the chancellor where
remedy was given by the common law. "This carries with it an admission,"
as lord C. observes, "that a power of jurisdiction did reside in the
chancellor, so long as he did not determine against the common law, nor
interfere where the common law furnished a remedy. The king's answer,
'that it should continue as the usage had been heretofore,' clearly
demonstrates that such an authority, restrained within due bounds, was
recognised by the constitution of the country." (p. 305.)

The act of 17 Ric. II. seems to have produced a greater regularity in
the proceedings of the court, and put an end to such hasty interference,
on perhaps verbal suggestions, as had given rise to this remedial
provision. From the very year in which the statute was enacted we find
bills in Chancery, and the answers to