int being
settled, the proper place for the Statue would be parallel to his (the
Statue of the DUKE'S) own. His own was the top of the arch on one side
of the road, and PRINCE ALBERT'S might be that of the gateway on the
other.

NELSON'S STATUE considered that the suggestion of the Statue of the
Noble DUKE was founded on the notion that the monument to PRINCE ALBERT
was intended to commemorate the Great Exhibition. In that case the
gateway at Hyde Park Corner certainly would be the fittest place for it;
near enough to the scene of the triumph, and alongside of the memorial
to the Hero of Waterloo. But, to speak straightforwardly, the fact was,
that the scheme of a Statue to the PRINCE was a device of the
Corporation of London to ingratiate themselves at Court. The Statue was
meant to be a propitiatory concern--to conciliate the protection of
Royalty for the City--and the proper situation for it would be over
Temple Bar, to serve as a Palladium to that edifice and the interests
therewith connected.

GOG and MAGOG, rising together, loudly expressed their approbation of
this view; the adoption of which would tend to secure themselves in
their own places, which they wished to retain as long as they were able,
like all others holding comfortable situations in Guildhall.

A motion embodying the concurrence of the meeting in the opinion that
the Statue of PRINCE ALBERT should surmount Temple Bar was then put and
carried unanimously, when, after the usual vote of thanks, the meeting
broke up, and the molten and graven images departed to their respective
sites.

* * * * *

SHERIFFS' OFFICERS SUPERSEDED.

We hear that an ingenious mechanic at Ipswich has invented a machine to
perform perpetual motion, which is described as "self-acting after being
put in motion by a screw." So is a bailiff who acts on a usurer's writ.
We wonder if the Ipswich automaton would arrest an insolvent?

* * * * *

MOTTO FOR THE ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH.--"Between you, me, and the Post."

* * * * *

CLOWNS OF THE NEW SCHOOL.

[Illustration: S]

Somebody said that it takes a wise man to make a fool. This stands to
reason, like the parallel proposition, that it takes a man to make a
beast of himself; for if anybody is rendered either beast or fool by his
own act, he cannot have been either the one or the other previously.
But, running counter to the prove