that they assume, at the
end of the war, that it had as a matter of fact proved so. This can
obviously only be understood in the sense that the numbers then in
South Africa were able to retard the Boer operations until a large
army was thrown into the country. On the other hand, Lord Lansdowne,
describing what was evidently the meaning in which this language was
understood by himself and his colleagues, says: "I am not a soldier,
but I never heard of sending out reinforcements to a country which
might become the theatre of war merely in order that the
reinforcements might successfully defend themselves against attack;
they are sent there, I imagine, for the purpose of securing something
or somebody." And again: "I should say not sufficient to prevent raids
and incursions, but sufficient to prevent the colonies from being
overrun." It appears necessary, under its historical aspect, to draw
attention to this discrepancy of view, because it is one that may be
liable to repeat itself.

[Sidenote: Plans delayed.]

Another point influenced by the unwillingness of Her Majesty's
Government to believe in the possibility of the Orange Free State,
with which we had had for many years relations of the greatest
friendliness, appearing in arms against us, was this: that it delayed
for a very considerable time the determination of the general plan of
campaign on which the war was to be carried on. Practically, supposing
it became necessary to conduct an offensive war against the Transvaal,
the choice of operations lay between a movement by way of Natal and
one by way of the Orange Free State. Any advance by Natal had these
serious disadvantages. In the first place, the mountain region through
which it would be necessary to penetrate was one that gave very great
advantages to the Boer riflemen. In the second place, it lay exposed,
as soon as Northern Natal was entered, to attack throughout its
entire length from the Orange Free State. On the other hand, the march
by Bloemfontein opened up a country much more favourable for the
operations of a regular army, whether that march, as was originally
proposed, followed the direct line of railway through Bloemfontein,
or, as it did ultimately, the railway to Kimberley and thence struck
for Bloemfontein.[1] There remained, indeed, a third alternative,
which had at one time been proposed by Lord Roberts, of a movement
outside the Orange Free State through the north-western portion of
Cape Co