ch of
cavalry and artillery to South Africa, should be taken up. Moreover, in
1897, he had pressed for horse-fittings for shipping, fearing the
trouble in this matter, which subsequently actually occurred. On taking
over the duties of Adjutant-General on October 1st, 1897, he, in view of
the extensive territory lately acquired in Rhodesia, proposed the
addition of 9,000 infantry to the army. The Commander-in-Chief, in
forwarding this memorandum, added to his request an additional 4,000
men beyond what Sir E. Wood had recommended. As late as February, 1898,
the transport, necessary to make the troops in South Africa fit to take
the field, was refused, though pressed for by the Commander-in-Chief, in
consequence of a private letter to Sir E. Wood, which showed Sir A.
Milner's anxiety on the subject. To suppress a small rebel Basuto chief
it would have required a month to get transport ready. At a time when a
man so intimate with South African affairs as Mr. Rhodes was deriding
all fears of Boer power, war was not believed to be imminent, and the
long habit of saving the public purse during peace time was operative
against expenditure, which would not be needed if there were no war and
no need for suppressing Basuto rebels. The same cause had delayed till
April, 1897, the necessary supply of horses to infantry regiments, at
which date L36,000 was granted for this purpose. Both these horses and
the training of mounted infantry at home had been repeatedly asked for
by Sir Evelyn Wood as Quartermaster-General, by Sir Redvers Buller as
Adjutant-General, and by Lord Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief.
_Equipment and Transport._
From the great variety of countries and climates, in which it has been
the fate of the British army to be engaged for the last hundred years
or more, it has always been impossible to foresee what the particular
equipment required for any given expedition would be.[18] To keep up
permanently all the transport animals and the large reserves of food
supplies needed for both animals and men would have been wasteful
extravagance. In one campaign, only human porterage had been possible;
in another, only transport by river boats; in another, it had been
necessary to rely chiefly on camels; in another, on the development of
canal and railway communication. Therefore, much time is always needed
before it is possible so to prepare a British army that it is ready to
wage war. An army is as little able to march til
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