of garrison gunners in the Cape peninsula.

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers approves.]

Sir F. Forestier-Walker had, however, the satisfaction to find that
these dispositions, which he had carried out on his own initiative
after consulting the High Commissioner, fitted in well with the plans
of Sir Redvers Buller, and were acceptable to that officer. A
telegram from Sir Redvers, dated London, 29th September, 1899,
informed Forestier-Walker that an expedition made up of an army corps,
a cavalry division, and seven battalions for the lines of
communication would be sent out to South Africa and would advance on
Pretoria through the Free State. That general was therefore directed
to make, so far as was compatible with secrecy, preliminary
arrangements for the disembarkation of this army at the three ports,
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London. In acknowledging these
orders on the following day, Sir F. Forestier-Walker accordingly
reported by telegram that he would arrange for the disembarkation
bases and that he was establishing advanced depots at De Aar,
Naauwpoort, and Stormberg;[55] Sir Redvers Buller, in a message
despatched from London on 2nd October, replied:--

[Footnote 55: These places had been suggested as suitable for
advanced depots in "Notes on the Lines of Communication in
Cape Colony," issued by the Intelligence Division, W.O., in
June, 1899.]

"Your proposals are just what I wish, but I feared suggesting
depots at Naauwpoort and Stormberg, as I did not then know if you
had sufficient troops to guard them. It will not do to risk loss.
I leave this to your local knowledge."

[Sidenote: Further Steps of Defence.]

On the 7th of October, 1899, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers landed
at Cape Town from England and were sent on the 10th to De Aar; a wing
of the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers left Stellenbosch by train for the
same destination on the 9th. Stores were already accumulating at De
Aar but, having regard to Dutch restlessness in the vicinity of
Naauwpoort and Stormberg, Sir F. Forestier-Walker, after personal
inspection, considered it inadvisable to risk any large amount of
material at either until more troops could be spared to hold them. For
the moment it appeared to him desirable to concentrate all available
mobile troops at the Orange River station, where he retained command
of both banks of the river, and thus, as soon as adequate strength was