ious defect inherent in this military system was the inequality
of the strength of the units created by it. A commando was a commando,
of whatever numbers it consisted; and these, contributed by districts
greatly varying in population, ranged from 300 to 3,000 men. Thus the
generals, placed in command of forces composed of many commandos of
which they knew nothing but the names, were ever in doubt as to the
numbers of men at their disposal, a difficulty increased tenfold by
the constantly shifting strength of the commandos themselves.
Straggling and absenteeism are evils incident to all irregular or
hastily enrolled armies, however drastic their codes of discipline, or
however fervent their enthusiasm; with the Boers these maladies were
prevalent to an incredible degree. Many and stringent circulars were
promulgated by the Boer Presidents to cope with this disastrous source
of weakness. But one and all failed in their object, from the
impotence of the officers whose duty it was to enforce them, and at
every stage of the campaign many more than the authorised 10 per cent.
of the fighting line were absent from their posts.

[Sidenote: Untrained staff.]

If such were the faults of the machine, those of the motive power were
not less glaring. No provision had been made in peace for the training
of men for the duties of the Staff. At Pretoria, the Commandant-General,
forced to reign alone over the twin kingdoms of administration and
command, had not unnaturally failed to govern either. The chain of
authority between Commander-in-Chief and private soldier, a chain whose
every link must be tempered and tested in time of peace, was with the
Boers not forged until war was upon them, and then so hurriedly that it
could not bear the strain. When prompt orders were most needed, there
was often no one to issue them, no one to carry them, or, even if issued
and delivered, no one present who could enforce them. Nor were the
ramifications of departmental duty, which, like arteries, should carry
vitality to every portion of the army, of any more tried material. In
most existing departments there was chaos; many that are indispensable
did not exist at all.

[Sidenote: Arms.]

The service arms of the burgher forces were the Mauser .276 rifle and
carbine.

The exact number of Mauser rifles brought into the Boer States is, and
will probably be always, uncertain. At least 53,375 can be accounted
for, of which 43,000 were imported by th