f the nineteenth century failure
followed failure because the services had not practised together. At
last they did so and the result was a brilliant success. The Japanese
have undoubtedly owed many of their triumphs to their having profited
by _our_ historical records. Their disembarkations have been models of
combined action.

[Sidenote: Causes of delay, real and imaginary.]

[Sidenote: Limit of striking force.]

On one other point the Naval triumph is of great importance to the
Army. The passage quoted above (page 111) from the report of the
Commission on the War marks well the facts. "The ships appear to have
been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as the troops were ready to
start." It follows that the shipping was just ready and no more for
the Army, after mobilisation, when the reserves had been called in and
incorporated. Moreover, it is to be noticed (page 100) that this
result was only secured by a splendid audacity in expenditure by the
Naval authorities, supplementing an admirable organisation. Now, as in
every war we carry out abroad, the earliest time at which any armed
force can move towards its object is the hour when the ships are ready
to convey it, it follows that no delay whatever was caused by the
necessity for summoning to the colours trained men retained for
service by a small fee. On the other hand very great delay was caused
by the impossibility of preparing for the particular campaign without
threatening those whom we desired to conciliate. It, therefore,
further follows that if there were ready at all times a force which
did not need to be ostentatiously prepared, we should avoid the crux
of not being able to make war without preparing for it and of not
being able to prepare lest we should provoke war. On the other hand,
this instance admirably illustrates the invariable law that the
strength that can be so used is strictly limited by the number of
properly fitted ships that the Admiralty can have ready at any given
moment. An examination of Captain Limpus' careful statement will show
how very small this inevitably is, and how much time is needed to fit
those that are not available. Moreover, there is, on the Army side, as
has been shown in Chapter V., this further restriction, that the
equipment and transport, without which a campaign cannot be carried
on, must be of the kind suited to the particular case.

SECTION III. THE WORK OF THE NAVY.

THE STOPPAGE OF CONTRABAND.

The task of