prepare before the outbreak of war was
insufficient, but the deficiency was remedied by indenting on India for
four field veterinary hospitals and 100 field chests, which enabled the
supply to be kept up to the subsequent demands.

[Footnote 38: The home establishment of the department was
63; 121 civilian veterinary surgeons were employed in South
Africa, besides those engaged by local Volunteers.]

[Footnote 39: Veterinary Colonel F. Duck, C.B., F.R.C.V.S.]

_Inspector-General of Fortifications._

This officer was responsible for engineer stores. The nature of those
required depends largely on the country in which the campaign is to be
carried on; therefore, practically no reserve was maintained of such
ordinary items as can easily be bought in the market. Of manufactured
goods, such as railway plant, telegraph material and pontoons, which
require time for production, there was an insufficient reserve,
notably of the last named. In order to send out a number sufficient to
meet the probable requirements in South Africa, all reserve pontoons,
including some of questionable value, were collected, and the country
was denuded. This deficiency had been represented on different
occasions, but for want of funds nothing could be done towards the
provision of new pontoons until October, 1899.

_Ordnance._

Of all the departments, this was subjected to the greatest strain and
was the least prepared to meet it. The reasons were as follows. For
some years previous to 1897 the system in force was that, although the
Director-General of Ordnance was charged with the supply of stores to
the army, the financial control and the entire direction of the
ordnance factories rested with the Financial Secretary to the War
Office, who belonged to the Ministry of the day. No supplies could be
obtained by the former unless with the permission and by the order of
the latter. The system conduced to a lack of sympathy of motive, which
caused a disinclination on the one part to ask for what on the other
there would be more than a disinclination to give. This tended to
crystallise the national proneness to defer until the emergency arose
the measures necessary to meet it. It followed, then, that while
attention was given to the needs of the moment, practically all
provision for the requirements of the future was relegated to the
background. A further defect in the system was that it resulted in
there bei