l it is supplied with
the necessary transport as a man would be without proper shoes, or a
cavalryman without his horse. For such a war as was in prospect in
South Africa, ranging possibly over tens of thousands of square miles,
immense quantities, both of animals and vehicles, would be needed. A
considerable proportion of these could no doubt be procured in the
country itself, but from the numbers required it was necessary to
extend our purchases over almost all the civilised world. This was
another of the cases in which the necessity not to provoke war tended
to prevent preparations for war.
[Footnote 18: See also Chapter V.]
[Sidenote: Land transport S.A.]
The question of land transport, on which so much of the conduct of a
campaign must depend, was one of the highest importance. The nature of
the South African country, and the absence of roads, rendered it
necessary that transport vehicles, intended for horse-draught, should
be adapted for draught by animals suitable to the country and likely
to be obtainable--namely, oxen and mules. The form of the wagons in
use had been settled twenty years before on South African experience,
by a committee consisting of Sir Redvers Buller and Colonel H. S. E.
Reeves, but the South African brake, not being convenient for home
service, was no longer used, so that this had to be supplied.
Moreover, it was necessary to convert the carriages to pole draught
for mule traction. The Director-General of Ordnance[19] asked, on July
26th, 1899, for authority to carry out this change, involving an
outlay of L17,650, but at this time, for reasons already given,
sanction was refused to any expenditure on preparations for
despatching an army to South Africa.
[Footnote 19: General Sir H. Brackenbury.]
"On the 1st September the Director-General of Ordnance again asked for
authority. On the 5th September, in putting forward a schedule of
requirements, he pointed out that this service would take ten weeks,
and said the sanction of those items should be given at once, on
account of the time required to manufacture and obtain them, and that
if put off till the force is ordered to mobilise it would be
impossible to guarantee their being ready in time."[20]
[Footnote 20: Extract from Minute by the Director-General of
Ordnance to the Commander-in-Chief, dated October 10th. See
Vol. I. Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission, p. 76.]
[Sidenote: D
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