would not be mobilised.
As the strain continually grew more severe it was found necessary to
mobilise successive divisions and additional batteries. Then, not only
had the loans to be made good to those depleted, but nearly the whole
of the personnel had to be found for the further number of fresh
organisms which were called into existence. This could only be done by
yet more borrowing. The difficulty, therefore, progressively
increased. More particularly was this the case with the ammunition
columns, the creation of which, together with the additional batteries
of artillery, caused a drain on artillery reservists, which resulted
in their being absorbed more quickly than those of the other branches
of the service.[13] All these special bodies, though essential for
war, were outside the peace establishment of the army. It became,
therefore, necessary to call out "the whole of the remainder of the
Army Reserve, in order to be able to utilise the services of
reservists belonging to Section D., none of whom could, by law, be
called out until all the reservists of all arms, in Sections A. B. and
C. had been called up."[14] This was done by special Army Order on
December 20th, 1899.[15]

[Footnote 13: The experiences of a particular battery, Royal
Field artillery, afford an illustration of the consequences
detailed above. From this battery, by the end of November,
1899, there had been drafted off to staff, service batteries,
ammunition columns, or excess numbers, the captain, the
senior subaltern (the only one who had had four months'
service in field artillery), five sergeants, one corporal,
one bombardier, four shoeing smiths, two trumpeters, the
wheeler, six gunners and five drivers. In December, 1899, the
battery commander, with the whole of one sub-division, was
taken away as the nucleus of a new battery to be formed. Ten
days after this the mobilisation of the battery was ordered.
Rather more than 50 per cent. of the battery when mobilised
were men of Section D. of the Reserve, of whom about half had
seen the gun which they were to work, while none had seen it
fired.]

[Footnote 14: Statement of the Mobilisation sub-division.]

[Footnote 15: The effect of this, as regards the cavalry, was
that some 2,000 reservists, over and above immediate