lony, but this had ceased to be applicable at the time when war
was declared. As a consequence of the uncertainties as to the ultimate
attitude of the Orange Free State, and the extreme hope that that
State would not prove hostile, it was not till the 3rd October that
Lord Lansdowne was in a position to say: "We have now definitely
decided to adopt the Cape Colony--Orange Free State route. It is
intended that a force of 10,000 men should remain in Natal, on which
side it will make a valuable diversion; that about 3,000 should be
detailed for service on the west side (Kimberley, etc.), and that the
main force should enter the Orange Free State from the south."

[Footnote 1: See Chapters II. and III. for full discussion on
the Theatre of War.]

[Sidenote: Limit of force.]

In all schemes for possible offensive war by Great Britain, subsequent
to a memorandum by Mr. Stanhope, of 1st June, 1888,[2] it had been
contemplated that the utmost strength which it would be necessary for
us to embark from our shores would be that of two army corps with a
cavalry division. Those army corps and the cavalry division were,
however, neither actually, nor were they supposed to be, immediately
ready to be sent out. To begin with, for their despatch shipping must
be available, and this, as will be shown more in detail in a
subsequent chapter, was a matter which would involve considerable
delay and much preparation. During the time that the ships were being
provided it would be essential that the successive portions of the
army for which shipping could be obtained should be prepared for war
by the return to the depots of those soldiers who were not immediately
fit for service, and by their replacement by men called in from the
reserve to complete the ranks. None of these preparations could be
made without attracting public attention to what was done. The
reserves could not be summoned to the colours without an announcement
in Parliament, nor, therefore, without debates, which must necessarily
involve discussions which might be irritating to Boer susceptibilities
at the very time when it was most hoped that a peaceful solution would
be reached. It was not, therefore, till the 20th September that the
details of the expeditionary force were communicated to the Admiralty
by the War Office, nor till the 30th that the Admiralty was authorised
to take up shipping. Meantime on September 22nd, a grant of L645,000
was made for imm