ssembled beforehand, so as to render it
more effective for war purposes. The course of the negotiations which
were then being carried on convinced Her Majesty's Government that any
such step would tend to precipitate war, and, the weakness of our
troops at the time in South Africa being such as it was, that it would
be impossible to reinforce them before serious attack might be made
upon them. Moreover, there was this further difficulty, that adequate
attention had not been directed publicly to the circumstances in South
Africa which caused anxiety to the Government.
[Sidenote: Causes of delay.]
It was always possible to think that the preparations for war on a
large scale, which were undoubtedly being made both by the Transvaal
and by the Orange Free State, were the result of the anxiety which had
been caused to the rulers of those republics by the circumstances of
the Jameson raid. Every attempt by any statesman at home to bring the
facts, as they presented themselves to those behind the scenes, before
the world, was open to the imputation of being deliberately designed
to lead up to a war which it was intended to bring about. Thus it was
the very weakness of our position at that time in South Africa which
made it difficult to relieve the military danger. Any premature effort
to place our power there in a condition of adequate security tended to
suggest to foreign states that the movements made were directed
against the independence of the two republics; tended to shake public
confidence at home, and even to excite jealousy in our own colonies.
All through the long negotiations which were carried on during the
summer and autumn months of 1899 it seemed better, therefore, to incur
even some serious risk of military disadvantage rather than to lose
that general support of the nation, whether at home or in the
colonies, which would be secured by a more cautious policy, and to
hope against hope that a peaceful solution might be reached.
[Sidenote: "Adequate strength."]
In one respect there would appear to have been a misunderstanding
between the Government and their military advisers as to the sense in
which the reinforcements sent to South Africa were sufficient for the
temporary protection of our interests on the sub-continent. It is
remarkable that in the evidence subsequently given by the soldiers,
not only do they admit that they anticipated beforehand that for this
purpose the strength would be adequate, but
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