of the government should derive their
appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the
States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these
legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress
MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States(1) are
actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government
should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some
instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act
on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also,
those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In
cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and
measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land
by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by
courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted
without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in
all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on
the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental
principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without
the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself
authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The
power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute
immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances,
was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal
expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be
submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it
an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly
recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had
not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to
recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine,
require that the powers of the general government should be limited,
and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession
of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new
government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the
States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their
sovereign and independent jurisdiction.
The truth is, that the great
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