owers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of
the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The
Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a bill of
rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights.
Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the
Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which
are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress, without any such
control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most
of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is
the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty
years? By the old it is permitted forever.
I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be
in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the
State for the means of carrying them into practice; that however large
the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I,
in the first place, that the Confederation is chargeable with the still
greater folly of declaring certain powers in the federal government to
be absolutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely
nugatory; and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, and
no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be
granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which
events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this is not all.
Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power,
which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from a
defective construction of the supreme government of the Union. It is now
no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory
is a mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is not of
such a nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or
for some time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public
expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper management, both
to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for
a certain period, liberal tributes to the federal treasury. A very
large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual
States; and it may with reason be expected that the remaining States
will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their equity and
generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that
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