should
accordingly proceed to form them into a second convention, with full
powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the
work of the first. Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it
required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it to
be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all
their enmity to their predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart
so widely from their example, as in the discord and ferment that would
mark their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before
the public, would not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as
Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his
own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted,
and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until ANOTHER
should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.
It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many
objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the
defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary
that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is
more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold,
because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a
shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building,
because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms
might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceilings a little higher or
lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving illustrations
of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections
urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the
existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous
in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress can
make requisitions to any amount they please, and the States are
constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as
long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and
at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to
raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power
also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and
unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body
of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all
the federal p
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