ian Empire, further prescribed
caution; and only by slow degrees did the Czar Alexander feel his way
towards an understanding with England. His jealousy respecting Malta,
and the uncertainties at London and Windsor, held these natural allies
apart for many months. Pitt did not hurry matters, doubtless from a
conviction that the conduct of Napoleon must before long bring both
Russia and Austria into the field. Meanwhile, he withheld subsidies
which would have helped them to arm for an almost inevitable
struggle.[685] We need not therefore trace the course of these coy
advances until they led to definite overtures. Here as always Pitt
showed a dignified reserve and a cautious regard for British finances,
which refute the stories officially circulated at Paris as to his
lavishly bribing the Continental States to attack France. As usually
happens, the prosaic truth long remained hidden in British despatches,
while the piquant slander gained all but universal acceptance.
Pitt's first thought was to enhance the value of England's friendship by
strengthening her navy and enabling her to take the offensive if an
occasion offered. The French royalist refugee, General Dumouriez, in a
long Memoir which he drew up for the Cabinet, pointed out that nothing
was more perilous than a perpetual defensive, as it allowed the enemy
quietly to perfect his plans for attack at any point over the whole
field.[686] Pitt was well aware of this danger. In fact, his policy of
military pinpricks, while apparently wasteful and inconclusive, had
prevented that concentration of the enemy's force which alone could
ensure the capture of London. Once more, then, he aimed at strengthening
the regular army, reducing the Militia to its usual quota, and raising a
large force of Volunteers. On 5th June 1804 he brought forward his
proposal for repairing the defects of Yorke's Army of Reserve Act. They
arose from the following provisions. A man, when drawn to serve in that
force, must either come forward, find a substitute, or pay a fine of L20
for each year of default. A penalty also fell on every parish failing to
supply its quota. The consequence was that parishes and individuals
offered high bounties in order to escape the fine--sometimes as much as
L40 or L60 per man.[687] These bounties naturally drew the best recruits
to the Army of Reserve, to the detriment both of the army and navy.
Another source of loss to the line regiments was the addition to the
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