, not only Europe
will have gained much, but we shall have gained for the separate
objects of this country more than enough to compensate for all
the expense of subsidies in this year; and we may return to a
state of separate war with little to guard against but the
single point of Boulogne and with increased means of
concentrating both our naval and land defence. The first object
therefore of my wishes is, the immediate rejection of the
mediation[745] and the _embarking Prussia at any rate in active
and decisive operations_ towards Germany and Holland, leaving
it to be considered afterwards what territorial arrangements can
be agreed upon to secure her permanent co-operation. The next
would be, in the event of negotiation, our being included in it,
on the terms of restoring all our conquests except Malta and the
Cape--and the third (and tho' the worst not a bad one) as good a
separate peace as possible for our perfidious Allies, leaving us
to fight our battle for ourselves....[746]

Pitt's indignation against Prussia did not lead him to fling a refusal
at her. On the contrary, he sought to postpone that announcement until
the expiration of the four weeks, within which she must make her
decision to side with or against Napoleon. Such was the purport of his
letter of 23rd November to Harrowby. He also announced an increase in
the numbers of the British force destined to serve in Hanover. This
expedition under General Don was now being pushed on with great zeal. It
met with disapproval from Canning, who with much sagacity pointed out,
on 29th November, that if the war were continued the gain of a month or
two was a trifling object; whereas, if the Allies ended the war, France
would certainly offer Hanover to Prussia.[747] The dash of pessimism in
Canning's nature enabled him to discern difficulties and dangers which
were hidden from Pitt's ever hopeful vision. Mulgrave seems to have
shared Pitt's view; for he signed all the despatches relating to the
Hanoverian expedition. On 23rd November he informed Harrowby that, early
in the year 1806, as many as 70,000 British and Hanoverian troops would
be ready for service, either in Hanover or wherever they could be
employed to most effect. He therefore expected that by that time the
Allies would have nearly 300,000 men in North Germany; and, as the
resources of Austria were not depleted by the disaster at Ulm, she an