ure of success in the rear of the
French Army in Germany. Still I cannot conceive what can be the
military reasons why an attack on Holland should not take place
at the same time, or at least should not be prepared so as to be
put into execution whenever the effect of any great success of
the Allies, or a frost, or an appearance of good disposition in
the country, should afford a favourable opening for such an
enterprise, the advantages of which in its impression and
consequences I need not state to you. We have finally decided
with a view to this chance and for the sake of shewing at any
rate our readiness to co-operate, to send the 12,000 men which
have been prepared, to Embden [_sic_], and if this wind
continues, I hope they will sail within three days. Endeavour to
make Prussia send under General Kalkreuth (or whoever may be the
general they destine for that quarter) not merely 10,000 men,
but enough to make such an army as can scarce be resisted. Our
force with the Russians (exclusive of the Swedes and after
allowing for something to watch Hameln[749]) will be near
40,000 men. It surely cannot be difficult for Prussia to add
30,000 to that number within a very few weeks on increased
subsidies beyond the number they now propose, and that without
at all impairing the effort against Bonaparte's army. As to your
stay at Berlin I can only say that if your health will permit,
_everything that we value most_ may depend on your remaining
till you have seen the leading points of the negociation fairly
through. As to details with Saxony and Hesse, they cannot be
worth your waiting for, if they require any time, which,
however, supposing you once to settle with Prussia, they cannot.
The important moment seems to be that when the issue of
Haugwitz's negociation shall have been known in Berlin and time
given to communicate with Austria and Russia on the result.
Under these circumstances it will I am afraid hardly be as
pleasant to you as it is to me to know that Parliament will not
meet till the 21st of Jany [1806] and that you have not on that
account any reason for your immediate return. If, however, (as I
most earnestly hope will not be the case) you should really find
the fatigue and anxiety too much for you, it is certainly among
_the things that we value most_, that you should