rs older than the Emperor, had far less physical
strength. We may judge, then, of the effect produced by a life such as
Lady Hester Stanhope described in a passage of more than usual
credibility: "Ah doctor," she said in her Lebanon days, "what a life was
his! Roused from sleep (for he was a good sleeper) with a despatch from
Lord Melville; then down to Windsor; then, if he had half an hour to
spare, trying to swallow something; Mr. Adams with a paper, Mr. Long
with another; then Mr. Rose: then, with a little bottle of cordial
confection in his pocket, off to the House until three or four in the
morning; then home to a hot supper for two or three hours more, to talk
over what was to be done next day:--and wine, and wine. Scarcely up next
morning, when 'tat-tat-tat,' twenty or thirty people one after another,
and the horses walking before the door from two till sunset, waiting for
him. It was enough to kill a man--it was murder."[730]

One who knew Pitt well gave wise advice to his secretary, William Dacre
Adams. "Attend to your meals regularly even if you sit up or rise the
earlier for it to get through the business. I have often been told that
half Mr. Pitt's complaints were originally brought on by fasting too
long and indeed only eating when he found it convenient, which ruined
the tone of his stomach."[731] These statements explain the reason for
the collapse of Pitt's strength late in the year. Hester's concluding
remark is somewhat hysterical, but it is nearer the truth than the
charge that Pitt was greedy of power. He killed himself by persistent
overwork on behalf of a nation which did not understand him, and in the
service of a Monarch who refused to allow him to strengthen his
Administration.

It is impossible now to feel one's way along all the threads which Pitt
held in his hands. But occasionally a chance reference reveals his
connection with designs of vast moment. The following is a case in
point. Castlereagh wrote to him, probably on 20th August 1805, in terms
which show that Pitt took a leading part in one of the decisions bearing
on the fate of the naval campaign which culminated at Trafalgar. The
daring and wisdom of his naval policy in 1805 has lately been fully
vindicated.[732] But the following letter throws new light on the
complex problem which arose after the indecisive success gained by
Admiral Calder over Villeneuve's French and Spanish fleets off Cape
Finisterre on 22nd July, and while the s