him madness. Even if he could have seen the
surprising events of May-June 1808, he would probably have distrusted
the spirit which prompted them. In truth, he lacked the sympathetic
instinct which led Canning at that crisis to side with the Spanish
patriots and thus open a new chapter in the history of Europe.
Yet it is but just to remember that Pitt the diplomatic bargainer of
1805 differed from Pitt the upholder of weak States in 1790, only
because the times had completely changed. Against the destructive
schemes of Joseph II, Catharine II, and Hertzberg he worked on the whole
successfully. But now Poland was gone; Sweden and Turkey were safe; the
German tangle had been cut by the Secularizations of Church domains in
1803. Now the danger was from the West. France had swallowed up her
weaker neighbours. Napoleon dominated Spain, Italy, Switzerland, the
Rhenish States, and the Netherlands. Russian policy, subversive under
Catharine, was in a European sense conservative under Alexander. Then
the most damaging thrusts to the European fabric came from Vienna and
St. Petersburg. Now they came from Paris. Pitt therefore sought to
construct a rampart out of the weak States bordering on France. As the
Barrier Treaties of a century earlier were directed against Louis XIV,
so now Pitt sought to inaugurate an enlarged Barrier policy as a
safeguard against Napoleon. The efforts of at least half a million of
trained troops being available, the time had apparently come for a final
effort to preserve the Balance of Power before it was irretrievably
impaired.
For a time the Russian and British Governments seemed in complete
accord. Novossiltzoff, on his return to St. Petersburg, wrote to Pitt on
20th March 1805 (N.S.), describing the entire concurrence of his master
with the principles on which they had agreed at London. In about eight
days he would leave for Berlin to put forth his utmost endeavours to
gain the alliance of that Court. He would then proceed to Paris to
present the Czar's ultimatum. A refusal was expected; but his master
believed it more dignified to take all reasonable means of ensuring
peace. The orders for mobilizing the Russian troops would go forth at
the time of his departure for Berlin. Before his arrival at Paris, he
hoped to receive from London full powers authorizing him to speak for
Great Britain as well as for Russia.[718]
All this implied the closest union and sympathy. But now Alexander
showed the o
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