ght forward 11,000 men, but at the expense of the
Militia.[688] Thus Pitt did not solve the military problem. Who indeed
has solved it?

Most fortunately for England, the Emperor had made serious
miscalculations respecting the flotilla now preparing at the ports
between Ostend and Etaples. First he armed his gun-boats heavily so that
they might fight their way across against a fleet. On finding this to be
impossible, he had to face the delay and expense of reconstruction. Next
the harbours at and near Boulogne proved to be too shallow and too small
for the enlarged flotilla. The strengthening of the French fleet was
also a work of time. England therefore gained a year's respite. Indeed
not a few experienced naval officers scouted an invasion by the flotilla
as impossible. General Moore also believed that Napoleon would never be
so mad as to make the attempt, which must end in our glory and his
disgrace. Only by continuing to threaten us could he do harm.[689]
Another sceptic was Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, who, in
a letter of 14th October, urged Pitt during his stay at Weymouth to
represent to the King the importance of attacking the flotilla at
Boulogne, if only in order to show the impracticability of Napoleon's
scheme. Experienced officers, said Melville, reported that the flotilla
must embark the troops in the outer road; yet the work of getting that
vast concourse of boats out of the inner harbour could not be
accomplished in less than four, five, or perhaps even six tides. We must
therefore attack them during this tedious operation. "Our officers and
seamen," he continues, "have a perfect confidence that they can attack
them under their own batteries, and put them into immediate
confusion.... Their confidence is founded on the experiment they have
already made of entering in the night the Bay of Boulogne and sustaining
for many hours the whole fire of the enemy's batteries without a single
man being hurt." Moreover, the British fire-ships, being like ordinary
ships, will take the enemy by surprise and cause irremediable
confusion.[690] Apparently the King and Pitt thought an attack not only
too risky, in view of the failures at Boulogne in 1801 and on 3rd
October 1804, but also needless, if the flotilla were no more formidable
than Melville pronounced. While inspecting the "Royal Sovereign" at
Portsmouth on 6th October the King wrote to Pitt enjoining great
caution, as a failure would be very discr