ich have been attained in those sciences. Of their
history very little is said; and, indeed, as we have seen (section 6),
lectures on the history of the inductive sciences are apt to be
regarded as philosophical in their character and aims rather than as
merely scientific.
The interest in the history of philosophy is certainly not a
diminishing one. Text-books covering the whole field or a part of it
are multiplied; extensive studies are made and published covering the
work of individual philosophers; innumerable historical discussions
make their appearance in the pages of current philosophical journals.
No student is regarded as fairly acquainted with philosophy who knows
nothing of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, Berkeley and
Hume, Kant and Hegel, and the rest. We should look upon him as having
a very restricted outlook if he had read only the works of the thinkers
of our own day; indeed, we should not expect him to have a proper
comprehension even of these, for their chapters must remain blind and
meaningless to one who has no knowledge of what preceded them and has
given birth to the doctrines there set forth.
It is a fair question to ask: Why is philosophy so bound up with the
study of the past? Why may we not content ourselves with what has up
to the present been attained, and omit a survey of the road along which
our predecessors have traveled?
84. THE ESPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES TO REFLECTIVE
THOUGHT.--In some of the preceding chapters dealing with the various
philosophical sciences, it has been indicated that, in the sciences we
do not regard as philosophical, men may work on the basis of certain
commonly accepted assumptions and employ methods which are generally
regarded as trustworthy within the given field. The value both of the
fundamental assumptions and of the methods of investigation appear to
be guaranteed by the results attained. There are not merely
observation and hypothesis; there is also verification, and where this
is lacking, men either abandon their position or reserve their judgment.
Thus, a certain body of interrelated facts is built up, the
significance of which, in many fields at least, is apparent even to the
layman. Nor is it wholly beyond him to judge whether the results of
scientific investigations can be verified. An eclipse, calculated by
methods which he is quite unable to follow, may occur at the appointed
hour and confirm his respect for th
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