e Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation
of sentiment characterize them throughout.

The "Principles" is a systematic treatise. If one has not time to read
it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the
first forty-one sections. For brief readings in class, to illustrate
Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38.

The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology of the names
in the title suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins
his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute
skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism.

For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human
Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part
IV, section 6.

Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us
asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument
by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good
exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his
"Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of
Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).

Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see
Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation,
N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of
philosophy by Ueberweg and Hoeffding (English translation of the latter,
London, 1900). Full bibliographies are to be found especially in
Ueberweg.

It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair
of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"
(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the
Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905).

CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could
regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him).
See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his
doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know
directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer
all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only
relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."

Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical
realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who
has not begun to refle