ct, in the first class. John Locke is a good
representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human
Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the
third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy."

Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes
on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of
its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address,
"The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902).

Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter XXXIV (entitled "Of
God"), "System of Metaphysics."

CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI,
"The Insufficiency of Materialism."

Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body"
(N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It
is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of
Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the
considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists.

Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance
historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its
meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The
Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality."
The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "God or Substance"
contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the
back of the first-mentioned volume.

Professor Royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist; see
the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute,"
or God, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite
minds are parts.

Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his
"Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known
or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities;
as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these
two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere.
The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are
compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the
distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming
incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one."

CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced
in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweep