James
abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian mentioned in
section 64.

But what do the words "verification" and "validation" pragmatically
mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of
the verified and validated idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with
reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they
instigate, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we
feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and
transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive,
harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what
we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202).

Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in
which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to
take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned.
That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch
becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note
his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does
take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The
doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121).

Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made,
and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It
is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I
shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly
written.

Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from
the above to merit another title. In the "Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey
brings out the distinction between his own position and that of
Professor James.

To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail.
Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the
"Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side,
Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben,
"Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July,
1908.

CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded
their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal
Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge"
(London, 1